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Vytautas Čyras, Vilnius / Lithuania
 
Friedrich Lachmayer, Wien / Austria
* 
 
Multisensory Legal Machines and Legal Act Production 
 
Abstract: This paper expands on the concept of legal machine which was presented first at IRIS 2011 
in Salzburg. The research subjects are (1) the creation of institutional facts by machines, and (2) 
multimodal communication of legal content to humans. Simple examples are traffic lights and vending 
machines.  Complicated  examples  are  computer-based  information  systems  in  organisations,  form 
proceedings workflows, and machines which replace officials in organisations. The actions performed 
by machines have legal importance and draw legal consequences. Machines similarly as humans can 
be imposed status-functions of legal actors. The analogy of machines with humans is in the focus of 
this paper. Legal content can be communicated by machines and can be perceived by all of our senses. 
The content can be expressed in multimodal languages: textual, visual, acoustic, gestures, aircraft 
manoeuvres, etc. The concept of encapsulatation of human into machine is proposed. Herein human-
intended actions are communicated through the machine’s output channel. Encapsulations can be 
compared with deities and mythical creatures that can send gods’ messages to people through the 
human mouth. This paper also aims to identify law production patterns by machines. 
Keywords:  Institutional  fact,  Legal  act,  Legal  status,  Legal  informatics,  Legal  visualization, 
Multisensory  law,  Production  and  communication  pattern,  Human  and  machine,  Encapsulation, 
Information system 
 
I. Machines and Humans are Similar in Legal Context 
This paper addresses people and machines as actors within legal transactions. The role of 
machines in the shift from raw facts to institutional facts is the subject matter. Raw facts are 
from the Is world whereas institutional facts – from the Ought [Kelsen 1967, § 3 ff.]. 
 
Actor Actor
Action,
a legal act,
e.g. a command  
Fig. 1: An actor (human or machine) executes an action which has legal importance 
 
                                                           
 Associate professor, Vilnius University, http://www.mif.vu.lt/~cyras/. 
* Professor, Leopold Franzens University of Innsbruck, http://www.legalvisualization.com. 2 
We continue investigating the legal machine concept [Čyras  & Lachmayer 2011]. A first 
glance is as follows. An actor (a human being or a machine) executes an action (a legal 
transaction, Rechtsgeschäft). The action is addressed to another actor or actors; see Fig. 1. In 
this paper the term “actor” is preferred to “agent” which is reserved for meanings used by 
informatics community in the domain of multi-agent systems (MAS). 
The Is world can be visualised with the metaphor of the stage. Here we view machines in 
the foreground and people in the background; see Fig. 2. Real-life workflows comprise both 
human beings and machines. Decisions are qualified as legal acts. Thus the workflows deal 
with conditions and effects. Legal theory appears as a metasystem. Objective law and legal 
theory impose a structure on machine behaviour. 
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Fig. 2: Legal machines in context: machine = analogy of human on the horizontal Is stage 
 
Machines communicate acts to humans who perceive the legal contents by multiple senses 
(sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch). Thus a kind of multisensory legal communication is 
observed. For the term “multisensory” we are indebted to Colette R. Brunschwig and her 
research on multisensory law (2003; 2011); see Section V.2. 
 
II. Legal Machines in Context 
Factual acts are from the Is world (i.e. the reality that is) and do not have legal importance 
whereas legal acts have it and also an interpretation with respect to the Ought world. 
A starting point of our departure is that machines are tools. Technology is substrate and 
thus it is not part of law. However, institutional facts can also be triggered by machines. The 3 
context of legal machines is introduced by the following cases: (1) vending machines; (2) 
traffic lights; (3) form proceedings such as FinanzOnline, https://finanzonline.bmf.gv.at/, in 
Austria; and (4) machines which are auxiliary to officials in organisations.  
Thus the point of departure is that an actor makes an action with an effect and this is 
under a condition, e.g. “Alice puts a coin in her piggybank”. Thus we start with the condition-
actor-action-effect model. To illustrate the notation, following is an instance, factualAct1: 
 
factualAct1 =  condition = undefined, 
actor   = ‘Alice’, 
action = ‘drops a coin in her piggybank’, 
effect  = ‘making savings’  
 
Besides  a  human  being  and  a  machine,  the  actor  can  also  be  a  deity,  a  text,  etc.  Legal 
importance is observed in conduct implying intent (konkludentes Verhalten) such as Chris 
putting  coins  in  a  ticket  machine.  A  fraud  is  committed  when  dropping  fake  coins  in  a 
vending  machine  whereas  a  child  may  put  old  coins  in  her  piggybank.  McCormick  & 
Weinberger [1992, 49-92] advocate a view “Law as institutional fact”. 
Factual acts can be lifted to the legal acts category by the actor’s role, for example: 
 
factualAct2 = listener_John_enters_courtroom 
legalAct2  = judge_Ken_entering_courtroom 
factualAct3 = pedestrian_Mike_raising_hand 
legalAct3  = policeman_Steve_raising_hand 
 
No legal  consequences  are implied by  factualAct3, whereas  legalAct3 implies:  drivers  are 
obliged to halt. Legal effects are important whereas the types of legal acts – speech acts or 
implications – are not. Persons putting coins into a vending machine engage in sales contracts. 
The  condition  can  also  have  legal  importance,  e.g.,  road  radars  make  photos  when  the 
vehicle’s speed exceeds certain value. Hence, each element – the legal condition, the legal 
actor, the legal action and the legal effect – are qualified to have legal importance. 
In the contract example, the relationships condition-actor-action-effect have horizontal – 
individual – effect since they concern private law. Traffic lights have vertical – general – 
effect as regulated by administrative law. The traffic lights normativity can be expressed in 
different formalisms. A pedestrian is prohibited to go on a red light, F(go), and permitted on 4 
green, P(go), though he can wait on the pavement, P(¬go), too. The automaton’s states are 
turned from red to green or vice versa. The algorithm changes permissions and obligations 
and distributes legal time and space between pedestrians and drivers. 
In  proceedings  workflows  such  as  e-Government  application  FinanzOnline,  decision 
makers  are  comprised  of  humans  and  machines.  Data  input  is  a  legally  binding  act. 
Computers that are comprised in information systems are substantially more complicated than 
simple  legal  machines.  Here  recall  e-Government  applications.  Suppose  a  machine  is 
described in terms of finite state automaton (endlicher Zustandsautomat). The number of its 
states can serve as a measure of complexity when comparing two machines. For instance, a 
very simple traffic light consists of three states: ‘red’, ‘yellow’ and ‘green’. On the contrary, 
information systems have substantially more states. Each keystroke can raise a different event 
and it brings the system to a distinct state (Zustand). 
There are no big differences between machines and humans in the production of legal 
acts by organisations. Suppose an official selling train tickets. A traveler makes a contract 
with the organisation – not with the cashier. Therefore the cashier can be replaced with a 
ticket machine. The right of representation is an issue. The question is, can machine represent 
an organisation’s body? The answer depends on the legal position of machines. This is the 
subject  matter  of  regulation  by  the  law.  The  legal  status  results  from  the  legal  order  (in 
accordance with the Ought; cf. also Pufendorf’s  impositio). A legitimisation is necessary. 
Then machine can count as administrator in organisation; see the formula “X counts as Y in 
context  C” [Searle 1995, 114]. Hence, two alternative bridging relationships  with  a third 
person,  the  buyer,  are:  (i)  organisation  -  administrator  -  person,  and  (ii)  organisation  - 
machine - person. The first arch in (i) and (ii) results respectively in two encapsulations, 
organisation-in-administrator and organisation-in-machine. In both cases the representation 
powers are scoped by the seller’s function. 
Today machines per se still do not reach the level of legal persons. They lack legal 
capacity and contractual capacity. However, imagine a register in future which is operated by 
a machine. It will become a kind of e-Person; see e.g. [Schweighofer 2007]. This is not in a 
reality yet. A paradigm shift for future is to complement legal actors with machines. 
Administrator-organisation  relationship  is  similar  to  that  of  a  slave  which  makes  a 
contract in favour of his master. The slave is a thing. However it is important that slaves could 
make  contracts  for  their  masters.  The  contract  is  not  for  slave  but  via  him.  Thus  two 
alternatives exist: via slave or directly. Machine’s position in nowadays organisations can be 
compared with the legal position of a slave. 5 
Machines appear in context which is important for human as it comprises various extra-
legal contexts, such as cultural, political, social, technical, and economic [Brunschwig 2011, 
577] and issues, e.g. legal protection, appeal, etc. The language to communicate the output 
from machine to human needs not to be a natural language like English or German. 
 
III. An Analogy between Machines and Humans 
Four types of relationships to send legal content are possible: two types on the output side – 
human  and  machine  –  and  two  on  the  input.  These  four  interaction  types  are  viewed 
differently in the context. The internal representations of information are different: texts for 
humans and programs for machines. Therefore, on the metalevel, different requirements arise 
for human-human and computer-computer interaction. The incoming texts can be read by 
people, but programs cannot be read by the users. 
 
1. Actor, Norm and Role 
We associate an actor with a norm, n (a general and abstract norm from the reality that ought 
to be). Here we do not discuss whether this is one norm or a system of norms. The content of 
the norm is the subject matter of material law and is out of scope of a jurisprudential survey. 
A certain role can be assigned to an actor executing an action. A role is a set of rights, 
obligations, and expected behaviour patterns associated with a particular social status. A role 
identifies a whole type (genus) of behaviour – not an instance. Role’s name is a label such as 
‘traffic light’, ‘vending machine’, etc.  
An actor complies with n. In the case of machine, software code enforces n. Suppose a 
norm  model  condition-subject-modus-action,  where  modus  is  ‘obligatory’,  ‘permitted’, 
‘forbidden’, etc. The factual act model condition-actor-action-effect conforms to it. Every 
concrete actual actor has to match the norm’s condition and subject. 
The sender who commits an action can be represented as an agent – “anything that can be 
viewed  as  perceiving  its  environment  through  sensors  and  acting  upon  that  environment 
through actuators” [Russell & Norvig 2003, 32]. 6 
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Fig. 3: Actor viewed as an intelligent agent. Agents interact with environments through sensors and 
actuators; adapted from [Russell & Norvig 2003, 33] 
 
“A human agent has eyes, ears, and other organs for sensors and hands, legs, mouth, and other 
body parts for actuators. A robotic agent might have cameras and infrared range finders for 
sensors and various motors for actuators. A software agent receives keystrokes, files contents 
and network packets as sensory inputs and acts on the environment by displaying on the 
screen, writing files, and sending network packets” [ibid. p. 32]. A vending machine has a 
mechanism to cash money and a mechanism to give the item. A traffic-light reacts to time and 
the light bulbs stand for actuators. 
To implement a machine agent, software engineers need a specification. Writing it is the 
subject matter of informatics, namely, requirements engineering. 
 
2. Situational Flexibility 
Human-human  interaction  is  more  flexible  than  human-computer.  People  can  adjust  their 
behaviour to a concrete situation. As an example suppose a train approaching a station and a 
person under stress going to buy a ticket. It makes a difference to buy from a cashier or a 
ticket machine. 
Multisensority  can  ease  layman’s  interaction.  Multiple  channels,  such  as  voice,  face 
expression,  eye  contact,  etc.,  can  be  used  concurrently  to  explain  situation  details  to  an 
administrator. Machines are less flexible in interpreting this multichannel information. But 
success stories of human-computer interaction by voice exist, e.g., a driver or a military pilot 
commanding the machine in a quickly changing environment. 
Situational flexibility features can be foreseen in machine specifications. An illustration 
is a rapid but expensive service instead of a slow but cheap. Communication in emergency 
situations, such as a need of ambulance, police or fire fighters, can be regulated by law. 7 
 
3. Multiple Human Senses – Multiple Formats 
Multisensory  properties  mean  multiple  input  channels.  Next  question  is  how  to  manage 
outputs which are produced by output channels. 
For  example,  a  legal  act  which  forbids  entering  can  be  issued  by  different  actors 
including  machines  and  technical  devices.  In  the  case  of  a  policeman  raising  hand  and 
whistling, a human recipient perceives the message by sight and hearing. A traffic sign is 
sensed by sight only. A barrier can also be sensed by touch. The understanding of verbal signs 
such as ‘Betreten verboten’ can be limited on people understanding German. 
The  format  of  a  recipient’s  input  channel  can  be  modelled  with  a  parameter  in  the 
message representation command(format, content), for example: 
 
command( format=gesture, content=“Policeman raising hand” ) 
command( format=acoustic, content= “Policeman whistling” ) 
command( format=visual, content=“Traffic light turns red” ) 
command( format=visual, content=“ ”) 
command( format=visual, content=“ ”) 
command( format={visual, touch}, content= “A road barrier on the street” ) 
 
These messages mean the obligation to halt (with semantic nuances), O halt or O no action. 
Hence, a need appears for a notation of normative multisensory messages. 
This is similar to the multiple formats of text documents. A document can be produced in 
multiple  output  formats  such  as  TXT,  DOC,  HTML,  etc.  Digital  signature  and  other 
properties can also be foreseen. Similarly, a legal statement can be outputted differently. 
Suppose a linear structure subject-predicate-object to model sentences in a self-conscious 
language. What are sentence formats in the unconscious and could non-linear formats be more 
effective? The question can be formulated: Can the cognitive cube be diced in other formats 
for visual, acoustic, motor functions, textual, logical, etc. representations of legal contents 
(Fig.  4)?  Distinct  formats  result  in  different  document  types.  For  example,  the  rules  of 
computer actions are represented in programs, not in texts. 8 
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Fig. 4: The metaphor of unfolding multisensory cognitive cube to multiple formats 
 
4. Multisensory Law is at the Periphery of Textual Law 
Suppose designing a multisensory legal machine such as traffic lights for disabled people. It 
has to be equipped with sound devices and touch panels. Therefore, first, the (verbal) road 
rules  concerning  disabled  have  to  be  transformed  into  legal  content  (multisensory 
commandments),  which  would  be  perceived  by  disabled.  Next  transformation  leads  to 
technical statements which implement the legal content to be sensed by hearing and touch. 
The resulting acoustic implementation can be achieved with the following transformations: 
Norm(subject-predicate-object) → command(acoustic,“beep”) → technical instructions 
Consider multiple transformations from the law through legal informatics to informatics. 
The multibridge metaphor is  shown in  Fig. 5. In these transformations,  multisensory law 
appears at the periphery whereas textual law is at the centre. Law is always textual for jurists. 
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Fig. 5: The multibridge metaphor: transformations lead from norm to its machine implementation 
 
5. Multisensority in Procedural Law 
Law concerns several tiers. The lowest tier is actors’ behaviour on the Is stage where actors 
interact in different forms: written, oral, gestures, etc. The ‘what’ is regulated by material law 
whereas the ‘how’ by procedural law. Parliaments cannot regulate so flexibly comparing with 
technical  standards  which  regulate  multisensory  communication.  The  reason  is  that  legal 9 
systems have to satisfy the minimality principle. Therefore the weak rules of multisensory 
behaviour  are  placed  in  technical  standards.  Though,  e.g.  the  written  and  oral  forms  of 
proceedings are regulated by the law. Examples of uni- and multisensory legal or legally 
relevant phenomena are provided in [Brunschwig 2011, 592-599]: voting in a parliament and 
video recording during the questioning of children. 
The  actors  on  the  horizontal  Is  stage,  humans  and  machines,  communicate  through 
various channels. Promulgation rules on the vertical tier of law could also be extended to 
multimodal channels such as Braille or voice. Reasonableness of this is next question. 
Hence, normative multisensority is a matter for wide regulation by technical standards 
that are made by expert groups. Technical issues should not be overregulated by the laws. 
Outdating technologies would be illegitimate. Recall the data protection law which required 
the currently outdated RTF format. 
Some machine types can communicate in signal languages that are regulated by technical 
standards. The combinatorics of human gestures and machine signals is addressed further. 
 
IV. Formalising Legal Machine as Encapsulation 
Formal models of the issues which are raised above are a challenge. Actors can be classified 
into humans, animals, allegories, machines, etc. Humans are legal actors whereas animals are 
not. Allegories such as the state and juristic person can denote legal actors. Legal machines 
are not juristic persons, however can be assigned a status-function. 
 
1. Human-in-Machine is Similar to Human-in-Animal Encapsulation in the Ancient World 
Examples of transformations of a human being into an animal and vice versa can be found in 
Greco-Roman myths. Mythical creatures such as minotaur
1, centaur
2, sphinx, etc. embody 
encapsulations. The Mechanical Turk
3 is an example of human -in-machine. In these ways 
human and animal combinations can be complimented with the encapsulations of machines: 
human-in-machine (e.g. The Turk) and machine-in-human. 
The word “person” is derived from Latin persona – actor’s mask, character in a play, 
later human being. “The term “person” refers to “man as a player of roles”” [Pattaro 2007, 
376]. The word refers to an abstract thing and can be implemented by machine. 
                                                           
1 In Greek mythology, the Minotaur, as the Greeks imagined him, was a creature with the head of a bull on the 
body of a man or, “part man and part bull”; see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minotaur. 
2 Composite race of creatures, part human and part horse; see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centaur. 
3 A fake chess-playing machine; see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Turk. 10 
 
2. Transforming Humans into Animals and Machines 
Human-to-animal transformations in the ancient world are about transforming a man into an 
animal such as a bird or an ass
4; recall the myth about Midas
5 and Apollo. The combinatorics 
to explore concerns four kinds of entities: (1) animal, (2) human, (3) mask – person (persona) 
including allegories such as state and juristic person, and (4) machine. Each entity speaks a 
specific language. An example of acoustic output is  a phone answering machine or GPS 
which give commands in voice. Formal logic is more a language of machines than people. 
We define encapsulation of an actor A1, called encapsulator, into an actor A2, called 
encapsulatee, to be a new actor denoted A1-in-A2 with the following abilities (Fig. 6 and 7): 
 
a) the encapsulator monitors (i.e. gives commands to) the encapsulatee in a language L1 
which is understood by both A1 and A2; 
b) legal content is sent to third persons in a language L2 of A2; 
c) encapsulator’s goals (i.e. motives, objectives, values) are pursued; 
d) encapsulatee’s, channels are used to transmit legal content. 
 
in a language L1
Actor 
A1
Actor 
A2
Encapsulation A1-in-A2
Communicating 
a legal act
Monitoring
Addressee
...
in a language L2
Human
Machine
 
Fig. 6: Encapsulation A1-in-A2 communicates legal act to addressee 
 
The idea is that a man A1 is empowered with a tool A2. Not all human functions of A1 are 
empowered, but a specific one, that is regulated by a norm n. A purpose is to combine the 
capabilities of both A1 and A2: capabilities(A1-in-A2) = capabilities(A1)  capabilities(A2). 
                                                           
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Golden_Ass. 
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Midas. 11 
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Fig. 7: Encapsulation A1-in-A2 
 
3. Encapsulation and Goals 
Encapsulations are viewed as goal-governed systems. The encapsulator embodies the external 
goals concept
6. These external goals are intrinsic in a norm n for which the encapsulation A1-
in-A2 is designed. The legal texts which serve as input to the legal machine A1-in-A2 can be 
viewed as a source of n. 
The encapsulation A1-in-A2 can be assigned a status-function. This status-function can 
be viewed as goal of use value (to be apt to … [Conte & Castelfranchi 1995, 124]) on A1-in-
A2. Conte & Castelfranchi note that the goal definitions could be shared with the cognitive 
sciences: “a goal is a representation of a world state within a system” [p. 123]. 
Intentional  goals  (i.e.  serving  as  external  goals,  values,  intentional  stance)  cannot  be 
assigned to every entity. Intentional stance is not intrinsic to machines. Deities and some 
allegories such as states and juristic persons can be assigned goals but machines cannot. “A 
stone per se does not have and cannot have any kind of goal” [Conte & Castelfranchi 1995, 
123-124]. Paraphrasing this, a machine (a tool, a gun) per se is neither good nor bad. 
 
4. Examples of Encapsulation 
Deities in Greco-Roman mythology have the form of human bodies. Recall gods, titans, etc. 
Personifications obtain both unnatural physical powers of gods and human bodily features. 
The human mouth sends legal content to people. 
Which type to assign to this pair of human and machine: human-in-machine or machine-
in-human?  A  starting  point  is  that  machines  are  tools  monitored  by  humans.  Second, 
machines do not have goals. The aim of coupling is to leverage human’s capabilities. In a 
powerful  combination,  humans  give  intelligence  to  machines  whereas  machines  leverage 
physical and computational capabilities of human beings. People obtain capabilities to fly, 
etc. 
                                                           
6 We follow [Conte & Castelfranchi 1995] and their terminology; see especially Chapter 8 “Towards a unified 
theory of goals and finalities”, 120-141. 12 
The encapsulation definition above implies the following consequences. 
  Human-in-machine means that human’s goals are pursued and machine’s channels are 
used to transmit legal content. The human uses the machine as a tool, e.g. pilot-in-aircraft 
and driver-in-car. 
  Machine-in-human  encapsulation  means  that  machine’s  goals  are  pursued  and 
human’s channels are used to transmit legal content. 
Suppose a policeman-in-machine example. A policeman watches images on computer 
display  that  are  transmitted  from  a  distant  camera  which  monitors  a  barrier.  The 
policeman’s command to stop the traffic is expressed in machine’s gesture – the barrier is 
being dropped. 
A meaningful example of machine-in-human encapsulation can be hardly provided. The 
reason  is  that  machines  do  not  have  goals.  Nevertheless,  suppose  a  malfunctioning 
machine  A1  sending  a  false  alarm  to  a  human  A2  who  commands  alarm  with  bad 
consequences. 
Human-in-machine  examples  below  illustrate  how  human  functions  are  assigned  to 
machines and animals: 
  Pilot-in-aircraft. Suppose two aircraft in the air. The first pilot orders the second one 
immediate landing. The signaling is in aircraft gestures, e.g. waving aircraft wings. The 
first pilot stands for A1 and his aircraft for A2. The goal of A1 is to force landing the 
second aircraft. Aircraft signal language stand for L2. 
  Policeman-in-car. Suppose a policeman A1 in a car A2 commanding a violator driver 
to stop. Any communication channel can be used: car lights, manoeuvres, a loudspeaker 
or even a gun. The goal is to stop the violator. Car signals stand for L2. 
  The Turk. The type is humanOperator-in-machine. The operator stands for A1 and the 
mechanical device that moves chess pieces for A2. A1 aims to win against the opponent 
player thus cheating him that machine thinks. Chess moves stand for L2. 
  Human-in-animal. The “Golden ass” mythical story illustrates a transformation of a 
man into an animal. The man A1 intends to spy with the goal to practice magic. Therefore 
he intends to transform into a bird A2. The man-in-bird would acquire the capabilities of 
both. However, while trying to perform a spell to transform into a bird, he is transformed 
into an ass. 13 
 
5. Representing Communication via Phone and Skype as Encapsulation 
Phone and Skype communication between humans H1 and H2 is described below to illustrate 
the human-in-machine notation. The communication chain between H1 and H2 is represented 
with two encapsulations and one transmission (Fig. 8). 
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Fig. 8: Human-in-machine encapsulation in communication via (a) phone and (b) Skype 
 
There are two channels between H1 and his phone M1: (i) voice to the M1’s microphone, and 
(ii) acoustic signal from the M1’s speaker to ear. The transmission between the two phones is 
through one channel: electric signal encodes voice. The whole chain is: 
 
1. Encapsulation human-in-machine H1-in-M1: A message from H1 to M1 is transmitted 
by voice. M1 encodes voice messages in electric signals. 
2. Communication: The message is transmitted from M1 to M2. 
3. Encapsulation human-in-machine H2-in-M2: M2 transforms electric signals into the 
phone’s  speaker  vibration  thus  transmitting  to  H2  via  the  acoustic  channel.  H2  is 
encapsulated into M2 with the purpose to receive electric-signals, which are decoded 
to acoustic signals by the speaker. 
 
A simple phone can hardly be viewed as a legal machine but legal status can be imposed on 
intelligent  machines.  Skype  communication  employs  video  and  file  transfer  as  additional 
channels. Therefore people can also communicate in gestures and mimics via Skype. 14 
Other devices and languages can be used, especially for medium distance transmission. 
Examples  are  naval  flag  signaling  and  Morse  code  which  can  be  transmitted  by  lights. 
Lighthouses can be viewed as legal machines for seamen, radio beacons – for pilots, etc. 
 
6. Encapsulations into Human: X-in-Human 
In contrast to encapsulations of human, human-in-X, that are described above, following is an 
example of encapsulation into human, X-in-human, and into animal, respectively: 
 
  allegory-in-human:  “Leviathan” by Thomas  Hobbes.
7 The type is  stateAllegory-in-
humanFormSovereign. The state allegory, A1, is encapsulated into the human-form 
sovereign Leviathan, A2. The L2 language is that of rule by an absolute sovereign – to 
wield the sceptre, a gesture language. 
  mask-in-animal: Biblical Leviathan.
8 The type is  gatekeeperMask-in-biblicalAnimal. 
A gatekeeper mask, A1, is encapsulated into a biblical sea monster, A2. The allegory 
can be viewed as a mask-in-animal. The Hell gate keeping language stands for L2. 
 
Actors  such  as  animals,  masks  and  allegories  can  be  attributed  intentions.  The  actors’ 
demands can be viewed as goals. Therefore the encapsulations animal-in-machine, mask-in-
machine  and  allegory-in-machine  are  meaningful.  A  question  is:  How  to  attribute 
responsibilities  to  the  actors?  Natural  persons  and  juristic  persons  are  held  liable.  The 
attribution of liability to animals and natural things is an issue of a historical survey. 
 
V. Related Work 
1. On the Concept of Role 
Ordinary people think in terms of roles whereas jurists – in terms of rules. The mask and 
persona concepts can be modelled by roles. The role’s name is treated as a label such as 
‘administrator’, ‘user’, ‘guest’, etc. (in the case of computer users). Actors send legal content 
to norm addressees, ordinary people. The addressee is attributed a role. 
In information systems engineering, a User is typically defined as a human or a software 
agent. Here we cite [Matulevičius & Dumas 2011] who compare security models and adapt 
Role-based Access Control (RBAC)
9 that restricts system access to authorised users. The 
                                                           
7 See the frontispiece of the book; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leviathan_(book). 
8  A  sea  monster  referred  to  in  the  Bible,  one  of  the  seven  princes  of  Hell  and  its  gatekeeper;  see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leviathan. 
9 D. F. Ferraiolo, R. Sandhu, S. Gavrila, D. R. Kuhn, R. Chandramouli, Proposed NIST Standard for Role -based 
Access Control. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), 4(3), 2001, 224-274. 15 
main elements of the RBAC model are Users, Roles, Objects, and Permissions (Fig. 9). A 
Role  is  a  job  function  within  the  context  of  organisation.  Role  refers  to  authority  and 
responsibility  conferred  on  the  user  assigned  to  this  role.  Permissions  are  approvals  to 
perform  one  or  more  Operations  on  one  or  more  protected  Objects.  An  Operation  is  an 
executable sequence of actions that can be initiated by the system entities. An Object is a 
protected system resource (or a set of resources). User assignment relationship describes how 
users are assigned to their roles. Permission assignment relationship characterises the set of 
privileges assigned to a Role. 
 
Operations Objects
Permissions
Roles Users
Permission 
assignment
User 
assignment
 
Fig. 9: RBAC model by Matulevičius & Dumas who adapted it from Ferraiolo et al. (2001) 
 
2. Legal Machines in Multisensory Law 
Colette  R.  Brunschwig  (2003)  proposed  the  term  “multisensory  law”  (“multisensory 
jurisprudence” as a synonym) and advocates that it is about multimodal (visual, audiovisual, 
etc.) representation and communication of valid legal content (geltendrechtliche Inhalt): 
The valid legal content denotes the content of valid law and also the content, which is significant 
for it. [Mit „geltendrechtlichen Inhalten“ meine ich Inhalte des geltenden Rechts, aber auch Inhalte, 
die für das geltende Recht bedeutsam sind. p. 413] 
Traditionally  legal  actors  are  comprised  of  lawyers,  judges,  administration  officials, 
parliament members, etc. [p. 411]. “Multisensory” implies that, at all times, more than one 
stimulus  is  involved  in  affecting  a  human  being  [2011,  581].  Discipline’s  definition  not 
trivial: 
 
Modifying the noun “law,” the adjective “multisensory” refers to which kind of law or which law is at 
stake. The law in question is not, for instance, copyright law, family law, or penal law, but another 
legal discipline, that is, multisensory law. The term “multisensory law” not only has terminological 
implications, but also concerns its subject matter and cognitive interest. [2011, 591] 
 
The subject matter of multisensory law consists of three phenomena [p. 592]; see Table 1 
below. The subject matter of legal informatics is analogous; cf. [p. 630]. 
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Table 1: The subject matter of two disciplines; adapted from figures in [Brunschwig 2011, 592 and 630] 
 
The words above are so interwoven that it is not easy to grasp the distinctions at once, but 
Brunschwig explains the meaning further in her analysis. Her study raises deep questions and 
also serves as a reader on several fields: 
 
…a first systematic knowledge basis for multisensory law and particularly for its relationship to visual 
law. …It has also added to what is known about legal informatics, notably about its branch artificial 
intelligence and law and its subarea visual legal representation. [p. 648] 
 
 
Fig. 10: A variety of modes in the production and perception of legal content 
 
Brunschwig’s classifications enable us to relate the subject matter of the analysed disciplines 
to machines. For example, legal visuals can be produced by computers. Thus machines would 
be related to the questions raised by her, e.g. “How do multisensory law and legal informatics 
relate to audiovisual law, auditory law, tactile-kinesthetic law, and olfactory-gustatory law?” 
[p. 648] 
  The subject matter of multisensory law  The subject matter of legal 
informatics 
A  The uni- and multisensory phenomena 
in the law 
The ICT-based phenomena 
in the law 
B  The law as a 
uni- and multisensory phenomenon in the law 
The law as an 
ICT-based phenomenon in the law 
C  The law as a 
uni- and multisensory phenomenon 
(the law in uni- and multisensory phenomena) 
The law as an 
ICT-based phenomenon 
(the law in ICT-based phenomena) 17 
We illustrate below some patterns of multimodal machine communication. Road and 
airport  radars  are  examples  of  visual  and  radio  communication  where  machine  vision 
produces legal consequences. A voice example is hearing commands in your phone: “In the 
case of…press 1, etc.” A thermostat perceives temperature changes  and turns the heating 
system  on.  Prescriptive  gestures  can  be  performed  by  machines,  too;  see  pilot-in-aircraft 
encapsulation  in  the  previous  section.  Multisensory  production  and  perception  are 
distinguished. The variety of modes is shown in Fig. 10. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
In this paper we depart from the view that machines are tools. The target view is that legal 
machines are legal actors that are capable of triggering institutional facts. Any computer bit 
can  encode  a  complex  meaning.  In  organisations  there  is  an  analogy  between  the 
administrator’s  position  and  machine.  Legal  content  can  be  expressed  in  multimodal 
languages (visual, audio, gestures, etc.), communicated by machines and perceived by all of 
our senses. 
To express that a human A1 is encapsulated into a machine A2 we introduced the concept 
of encapsulation. Actions intended by A1 are communicated to third persons via the output 
channel of A2. Encapsulations can be compared with mythical creatures, part human and part 
animal, which can send gods’ messages through the human mouth. 
Multimodal communication is regulated by technical standards that give flexibility to the 
“how”. The promulgation law cannot regulate so flexibly. This paper aims at a formalisation, 
which is suitable for both legal scholars and (software) engineers. 
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